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I. INTRODUCTION
The doctrine of employment at will has been a fixture of American
common law for approximately a century.1 In its pristine form, the doc-
trine is a rule of construction, establishing a rebuttable presumption
that the terms of an employment agreement permit either the employer
or the employee to terminate the relationship at any time and for any
reason.' Unless the employee rebuts the at-will presumption by adduc-
ing evidence of an explicit agreement to the contrary, an employer may
fire the employee for good cause, no cause, or bad cause without incur-
1. Horace Gray Wood's treatise on master and servant law offered the first scholarly state-
ment of the at-will doctrine. See H.G. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT (2d
ed. 1886); see also Martin v. New York Life Ins. Co., 148 N.Y. 117, 42 N.E. 416 (1895) (stating in
1895 that the at-will doctrine was correct and widely in use). See generally Feinman, The Devel-
opment of the Employment At Will Rule, 20 Ax J. LEGAL HisT. 118 (1976) (describing develop-
ment of the at-will doctrine).
2. See H.G. WooD, supra note 1; see also Payne v. Western & Atl. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-20
(1884) (providing the classic statement of the at-will doctrine and its rationale), rev'd on other
grounds sub noam. Hutton v. Watters, 132 Tenn. 527, 179 S.W. 134 (1915).
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ring any legal liability.' Experts have estimated that up to seventy-five
million employees are subject to this harsh dismissal standard.4
In recent years the at-will doctrine has suffered substantial erosion
as a common-law principle. A vast majority of state courts have fash-
ioned various tort- and contract-law exceptions in a piecemeal attempt
to diminish the doctrine's inherent potential for employer abuse.5 In a
flood of normative argument, legal commentators have advocated alter-
natively the judicial or legislative expansion of these exceptions or abo-
lition of the at-will doctrine and implementation of a requirement that
all dismissals be for just cause." In response, one state and two territo-
rial legislatures have supplanted the at-will doctrine completely by stat-
utorily adopting the just cause dismissal standard or an equivalent.
Proponents have advanced both moral and economic considera-
tions for replacing the at-will doctrine with a just cause dismissal stan-
dard.8 These commentators decry the narrow protection afforded
employees by the at-will exceptions and argue that a general just cause
standard would be economically efficient." Labor markets have not
forced the adoption of just cause standards, they claim, only because
employers possess unequal bargaining power and because employees are
misinformed about the risks of arbitrary discharge.' 0
3. Payne, 81 Tenn. at 519-20.
4. The Employment At-Will Issue: A BNA Special Report, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No.
225, at 7 (Nov. 1982). Of course, at-will employees desire some protection from the various judicial
and statutory exceptions to the at-will doctrine. See infra subparts H(B)-(D).
5. See infra subparts H(B)-(D). But see Murphy v. American Home Prods., 58 N.Y.2d 293,
448 N.E.2d 86, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232 (1983) (rejecting judicially created exceptions to the employment
at-will rule). For an overview of each state's wrongful discharge law, see Cathcart & Thomason,
State by State Survey of Wrongful Termination Case Law, in 1 LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW 433
(P. Panken 5th ed. 1990). See also L. LARSON & P. BoRowsKY, 1 UNJUST DISMISSAL §§ 10.01-10.52
(1990 & Supp. 1990) (analyzing the doctrine state by state); I. SHEPARD, P. HEYLMAN & R. DUSTON,
WITHOUT JUST CAUSE: AN EMPLOYER'S PRACTICAL AND LEGAL GUIDE ON WRONGFUL DISCHARGE A-1
(1989) (providing a state-by-state guide to wrongful discharge law).
6. See, e.g., Blades, Employment At Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive
Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 1404 (1967); Peck, Unjust Discharges from Em-
ployment: A Necessary Change in the Law, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1979); Summers, Individual Pro-
tection Against Unjust Dismissal: Time for a Statute, 62 VA. L. REv. 481 (1976); Note, Protecting
Employees At Will Against Wrongful Discharge: The Public Policy Exception, 96 HARv. L. REv.
1931 (1983) [hereinafter Note, Public Policy Exception]; Note, Protecting At Will Employees
Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 HARv. L. REv. 1816
(1980) [hereinafter Note, Protecting At Will Employees]; Note, Implied Contract Rights to Job
Security, 26 STAN. L. REv. 335 (1974).
7. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-901 to 39-2-914 (1987); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 29, § 185a
(1985); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 24, §§ 76-79 (Supp. 1990). See generally L. LARSON & P. BOROWSKY,
supra note 5, § 5.07.
8. See sources cited supra note 6.
9. See, e.g., Note, Protecting At Will Employees, supra note 6, at 1830-36.
10. See, e.g., Blades, supra note 6, at 1410-13; Note, Protecting At Will Employees, supra
note 6, at 1830-36.
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A small number of commentators have rejected the intellectual
trend toward, as well as the arguments for, just cause requirements.1
These theorists argue that economic efficiency best explains the persist-
ence of at-will employment and that the doctrine's persistence cannot
be accounted for in terms of putative market failures such as unequal
bargaining power.' 2 According to this argument, market constraints suf-
ficiently check profit-draining abuse by employers, making governmen-
tal or judicial intervention unnecessary."3 In addition, employers forced
to provide job security in the form of just cause dismissal requirements
merely will transfer the cost of these measures to the employee in the
form of lower wages.' 4 In fact, lower wage employees, perceived by em-
ployers as essentially fungible, would bear a disproportionate share of
the costs of a mandatory just cause dismissal requirement precisely be-
cause of their comparatively acute lack of bargaining power.1 5 This ar-
gument implies that the imposition of a just cause standard itself might
be unjust.
This Note discusses the economic and moral rationales for replac-
ing the at-will doctrine with a general just cause dismissal standard and
proposes an alternative that fairly and efficiently balances all the inter-
ests involved. Part II traces the development of the at-will doctrine,
describing its history and critically discussing the various kinds of judi-
cial and statutory exceptions to the doctrine. Part III examines the eco-
nomic and moral arguments for and against implementing a mandatory
just cause dismissal standard. Part IV advocates reversing the presump-
tion of employment at will on both economic and moral grounds and
argues that courts should establish a rebuttable presumption that an
employee can be fired only for just cause, rather than at will. This Note
concludes that establishing a rebuttable presumption that an employee
can be discharged only for just cause would preserve employment-at-
will's economic benefits, while fully protecting those employees most
likely to be devastated by an arbitrary discharge.
11. See, e.g., Epstein, In Defense of the Contract At Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REv. 947 (1984);
Freed & Polsby, Just Cause for Termination Rules and Economic Efficiency, 38 EMORY L.J. 1097
(1989); Note, Employer Opportunism and the Need for a Just Cause Standard, 103 HARv. L. REv.
510 (1989).
12. Epstein, supra note 11, at 973-77; Freed & Polsby, supra note 11, at 1099-1137.
13. Epstein, supra note 11, at 966-68.
14. Freed & Polsby, supra note 11, at 1101-02; Harrison, The "New" Terminable-At-Will
Employment Contract: An Interest and Cost Incidence Analysis, 69 IowA L. REv. 327, 344-45
(1984).
15. See Harrison, supra note 14, at 342-45 (concluding that the costs of job security absorbed
by workers in monopolistic contexts will be related inversely to their skill, education, and wealth).
1991]
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II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE EMPLOYMENT AT-WILL DOCTRINE
A. Origins of the Doctrine
English common law presumed that employment for an indefinite
period was for a year, in the absence of custom or evidence to the con-
trary."6 This rule had its basis in the equitable principle that neither
employees nor employers should reap the benefits of the employment
relationship when it was fruitful and then abandon it when it was not.17
Courts subsequently qualified the English rule by allowing termination
after reasonable notice.18 The courts construed reasonable notice on a
case-by-case basis as a question of fact.19
Early American law evidently exhibited some confusion about the
standard for interpreting employment contracts of indefinite duration.
Courts seem to have followed three different approaches. Some courts
adopted a bifurcated standard, following the English rule and presum-
ing yearly hirings for agricultural and domestic workers, while effec-
tively treating other workers, such as day laborers, as employees at
wily.2 A second approach presumed that the length of employment
equalled the employee's wage period.21 Finally, some courts discarded
all presumptions and determined the duration of employment from the
intent of the parties as shown by the facts and surrounding circum-
stances, including custom and prior course of dealing between the
parties.22
In this context of confusion about the appropriate rule of construc-
tion for employment contracts of indefinite duration, the doctrine of
employment at will made its unprecedented appearance. Although the
increasingly industrialized American society recognized the English rule
as anachronistic, 3 courts had not rejected the doctrine firmly and no
authority even had stated the at-will doctrine in its present form until
1877, when a treatise writer, Horace Gray Wood, announced the at-will
doctrine as the "inflexible" American rule.24 Wood cited no cases actu-
ally supporting the doctrine and articulated no policy grounds for its
adoption.2" Nor was the at-will presumption an accurate reflection of
16. Feinman, supra note 1, at 119-22. The English rule has its etiology in Blackstone's Com-
mentaries. See 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 425-26 (Bell ed. 1771).
17. Feinman, supra note 1, at 119-22.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. See A. HILL, WRONGFUL DISCHARGE AND THE DEROGATION OF THE AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT
DOCTRINE 3 (1987); Feinman, supra note 1, at 122.
21. See 1 L. LARSON & P. BOROWSKY, supra note 5, § 2.03, at 2-4 to 2-6.
22. See id.
23. See Feinman, supra note 1, at 125.
24. See H.G. WooD, supra note 1, § 134, at 272-73; see also Feinman, supra note 1, at 125-27.
25. See Feinman, supra note 1, at 126; see also Summers, supra note 6, at 485 (reporting
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the usual duration of employment contracts in this period. 6 Despite
these facts, commentators hailed Wood's treatise as a work of genius,2 7
and courts throughout the United States quickly embraced and strictly
applied the at-will doctrine."'
Scholars have posited various explanations for the reception
granted the at-will doctrine in the United States.29 Historians generally
agree, however, that the laissez-faire economic ideology gaining ascen-
dency at the time of Wood's treatise contributed significantly to the
doctrine's success.30 At one point, the at-will doctrine became so un-
equivocally accepted and intellectually fashionable that the Supreme
Court found constitutional underpinnings for it in the due process
clause. s Over time the Court has abandoned this position and has up-
held the constitutionality of statutory exceptions to the at-will doc-
trine. 2 In addition, courts have developed three major judicial
exceptions to the at-will doctrine that provide employees with some
measure of protection against employer abuse.
B. The Public Policy Exception
Adopted in some form by a strong majority of states,"3 the public
policy exception renders employers liable in tort or contract for dis-
charges that undermine a clear public policy. 4 The general rationale
underlying the exception is that the at-will doctrine should not inhibit
the achievement of public policy objectives.3 5 Thus, for example, in the
that the four cases cited by Wood do not support the doctrine of employment at will).
26. See Feinman, supra note 1, at 130-31.
27. See, e.g., id. at 126 n.68 (quoting Book Notices, 15 ALB. L.J., Jan.-July 1877, at 378-79).
28. See, e.g., Martin v. New York Life Ins. Co., 148 N.Y. 117, 42 N.E. 416 (1895).
29. For a good overview of the various explanations, see A. HILL, supra note 20, at 5-6.
30. See id. at 4-5; L. LARSON & P. BOROWSKY, supra note 5, § 2.04, at 2-7; Feinman, supra
note 1, at 124-25.
31. See Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915) (striking down a state statute prohibiting the
firing of union members as violative of due process); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908)
(striking down a federal statute prohibiting the firing of union members).
32. E.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (upholding constitutional-
ity of those provisions of the National Labor Relations Act prohibiting employer discrimination
against employees because of union activity).
33. At least 43 states have adopted the public policy exception. See Chagares, Utilization of
the Disclaimer As an Effective Means to Define the Employment Relationship, 17 HOFSTRA L.
REv. 365, 370 (1989); see also Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 765 P.2d 373, 254
Cal. Rptr. 211 (1988); Parnar v. Americana Hotels, Inc., 65 Haw. 370, 652 P.2d 625 (1982);
Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 IlM. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981); Thompson v. St.
Regis Paper Co., 102 Wash. 2d 219, 685 P.2d 1081 (1984). But see Murphy v. American Home
Prods., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 448 N.E.2d 86, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232 (1983) (rejecting the public policy
exception).
34. See infra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
35. See Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25
(1959).
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seminal case of Petermann v. International Brotherhood of Team-
sters6 the court recognized a cause of action against an employer who
had fired an at-will employee for refusing to perjure himself before a
legislative committee. The court noted that a state statute specifically
enjoined perjury and that allowing the employer to use its at-will power
to force an employee to violate the statute would contravene public pol-
icy and general state interests.37
On its face, the public policy exception provides employees with a
broad measure of protection against arbitrary dismissals. Indeed, be-
cause all, arbitrary dismissals affect some public interest negatively,38
the exception would seem to prohibit all such dismissals. In practice,
however, courts have restricted the scope of the exception's operation in
a number of ways. For example, courts have held that the availability of
other statutory or administrative relief for a particular discharge
preempts a cause of action under the public policy exception."9 Also,
courts generally have required that a discharge implicate a strong pub-
lic interest to trigger the public policy exception and have refused to
apply the exception if the interest at stake appeared merely private or
proprietary." In Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical,"' for example, the
court held that the plaintiff did not have a cause of action under the
public policy exception when she refused to perform certain research
solely on personal moral grounds. The court reasoned that because the
plaintiff objected for purely personal reasons, she had failed to articu-
late a clear public policy violation. 2
Restrictive views on the legitimate sources of public policy also
have limited the scope of discharges covered by the public policy excep-
36. Id.
37. Id. at 188-89, 344 P.2d at 27.
38. See Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 133, 316 A.2d 549, 551 (1974) (holding
that arbitrary dismissals are not in the best interest of the economic system or the public); see also
Note, Public Policy Exception, supra note 6, at 1948 (stating that "[a]ll dismissals without 'just
cause,' no matter how 'private' their motivation, undermine the community's interest in economic
productivity, stable employment, and fairness in the workplace").
39. See, e.g., Ficalora v. Lockheed Corp., 193 Cal. App. 3d 489, 238 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1989)
(holding that the California Fair Employment and Housing Act preempts a cause of action for
wrongful discharge when an employee allegedly was fired for complaining to the Department of
Labor about the employer's sex discrimination); Makovi v. Sherwin Williams, 316 Md. 603, 516
A.2d 179 (1989) (refusing to recognize a common-law cause of action for wrongful discharge when
Title VII provides a remedy). At least one author has argued, contrary to the holding in Makovi,
that Title VII should not be accorded preemptive effect. See Greenbaum, Toward a Common Law
of Employment Discrimination, 58 TEMP. L.Q. 65 (1985).
40. See, e.g., Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical, 84 N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505 (1980); Campbell v.
Ford Indus., 274 Or. 243, 546 P.2d 141 (1976) (finding no cause of action for wrongful discharge
when an employee-stockholder was fired for pursuing stockholders' rights against the employer).
41. Pierce, 84 N.J. at 58, 417 A.2d at 505.
42. Id. at 72, 417 A.2d at 512.
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tion. Under the guise of balancing the interests of employer, employee,
and society, and of refusing to usurp legislative prerogative, a number
of courts have limited the sources of public policy to statutes and con-
stitutions.4" Even courts that do not adopt this limitation are much
more likely to allow a cause of action under the public policy exception
if an explicit statutory basis for the public policy exists. Thus, courts
have allowed a cause of action for the discharge of an employee for the
refusal to violate a state statute,44 for the exercise of a statutory right,45
and for compliance with a statutory duty.4 Some courts hesitantly have
asserted their common-law power to modify law and have expressed a
willingness to consider judicial opinions as valid sources of public pol-
icy, but have been quick to affirm the primacy of legislative pronounce-
ments.47 A number of states have refused to limit public policy to those
policies expressed in legislative sources, but also have noted that some
statutes or constitutional provisions do not inure to the benefit of the
public at large and, therefore, should not serve as sources of public pol-
icy. 48 In stark contrast to these decisions, a more progressive approach
treats the existence of public policy as an issue of fact to be decided by
the jury.49
Courts also disagree on whether the public policy exception sounds
in tort or contract. 0 Because the exception does not aim to enforce the
intentions of contracting parties, but instead to vindicate social policy,
43. See, e.g., Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Oxford, 294 Ark. 239, 743 S.W.2d 380 (1988); Firestone
Tire & Rubber Co. v. Meadows, 666 S.W.2d 730, 731 (Ky. 1983); Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet,
113 Wis. 2d 561, 573, 335 N.W.2d 834, 840 (1983). But see Palmateer, 85 Ill. 2d at 124, 421 N.E.2d
at 876 (applying the public policy exception when no express statutory basis for public policy
existed). Some courts even have based public policy on federal constitutional provisions. See, e.g.,
Novosel v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 721 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1983) (permitting a cause of action under the
public policy exception based on first amendment rights).
44. See, e.g., Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr.
839 (1980) (refusing to engage in price fixing); Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 147 Ariz.
370, 710 P.2d 1025 (1985) (refusing to violate indecent exposure laws); Coman v. Thomas Mfg. Co.,
325 N.C. 172, 381 S.E.2d 445 (1989) (refusing to operate trucks in violation of federal law).
45. See, e.g., Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978) (filing a worker's
compensation claim); Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973)
(same).
46. See, e.g., Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975) (serving jury duty); Reuther v.
Fowler & Williams, Inc., 255 Pa. Super. 28, 386 A.2d 119 (1978) (same); Ludwick v. This Minute of
Carolina, Inc., 287 S.C. 219, 337 S.E.2d 213 (1985) (complying with a subpoena).
47. See, e.g., Wagenseller, 147 Ariz. at 379, 710 P.2d at 1034; Parnar v. Americana Hotels,
Inc., 65 Haw. 370, 380, 652 P.2d 625, 631 (1982).
48. See, e.g., Wagenseller, 147 Ariz. at 378-80, 710 P.2d at 1033-35; Foley v. Interactive Data
Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 669, 765 P.2d 373, 379, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211, 217 (1988); Adler v. American
Standard Corp., 290 Md. 615, 432 A.2d 464, 472 (1981), affld in part and rev'd in part, 830 F.2d
1303 (4th Cir. 1987).
49. Cilley v. New Hampshire Ball Bearings, Inc., 128 N.H. 401, 405-06, 514 A.2d 818, 821
(1986).
50. See infra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
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a majority of courts have construed the action against the employer as a
tort.5 1 A few courts, however, have characterized an action under the
exception as one for the breach of a covenant, implied by law, that the
employer will not discharge an employee for reasons contrary to public
policy.2 As a result, these courts award only contract damages.
A small minority of states have rejected the public policy exception
on the grounds that the legislature, not the judiciary, should create ex-
ceptions to the at-will doctrine.53 These states defer to the legislature to
facilitate stability and predictability in contractual relations and be-
cause legislatures are better equipped to discern the public will on these
issues and to assess the economic impact of exceptions to the at-will
rule. 4 Wieder v. Skala55 demonstrates the harsh consequences that flow
from refusals to recognize the public policy exception. In Wieder a law
firm fired an attorney after he reported another attorney in the firm to
a disciplinary committee for violations of New York's Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility (Code). The fired attorney brought a wrongful dis-
charge action against the law firm, arguing that the Code required him
to report the ethical violations after the law firm refused to do so. The
New York court refused to apply the public policy exception and dis-
missed the fired attorney's claim because he was an employee at will.56
51. See, e.g., Wagner v. City of Globe, 150 Ariz. 82, 722 P.2d 250 (1986); Wagenseller, 147
Ariz. at 381, 710 P.2d at 1036; Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164
Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980); Parnar, 65 Haw. at 370, 652 P.2d at 625; Palmateer, 85 Ill. 2d at 124, 421
N.E.2d at 876; Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wash. 2d 219, 230, 685 P.2d 1081, 1088
(1984).
52. E.g., Sterling Drug, Inc., 294 Ark. at 239, 743 S.W.2d at 380; Johnson v. Kreiser's, Inc.,
433 N.W.2d 225 (S.D. 1988);-Brockmeyer, 113 Wis. 2d at 574-75, 335 N.W.2d at 841. At least one
state recognizes both tort and contract causes of action under the public policy exception. See
Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical, 84 N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505 (1980).
53. See, e.g., Murphy v. American Home Prods., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232, 448
N.E.2d 86 (1983); cf. Georgia Power Co. v. Busbin, 242 Ga. 612, 250 S.E.2d 442 (1978) (holding
that allegations of improper motive for discharge are legally irrelevant). But see Brockmeyer, 113
Wis. 2d at 573-74, 335 N.W.2d at 840-41 (rejecting the argument that recognizing an action for
wrongful discharge usurps legislative prerogative).
54. See, e.g., Hartley v. Ocean Reef Club,' 476 So. 2d 1327, 1329-30 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985);
Sabetay v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 69 N.Y.2d 329, 336-37, 506 N.E.2d 919, 923, 514 N.Y.S.2d 209, 213
(1987) (explaining the rationale of Murphy); Murphy, 58 N.Y.2d at 301-02, 448 N.E.2d at 89-90,
461 N.Y.S.2d at 235-36.
55. 144 Misc. 2d 346, 544 N.Y.S.2d 971 (Sup. Ct. 1987), afl'd, 562 N.Y.S.2d 930 (App. Div.
1990). The facts of the case are recounted in detail in Harold, Dilemmas, Student Writer, Nov.
1990, at 8.
56. Wieder, 144 Misc. 2d at 349, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 973. The public policy exception also has
been criticized as incorporating bias in favor of upper-level employees. See Note, Public Policy
Exception, supra note 6 (suggesting that the kind of discharges barred by the exception are apt to
occur only in upper-level labor markets).
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C. The Implied Contract Exception
Employment law's recognition of paradigm shifts57 in contract law
has given rise to the other principal exceptions to the at-will doctrine.
The first of these does not really function as an exception to the doc-
trine at all, but merely as an alternative doctrinal means for rebutting
the at-will presumption. This alternative, the implied contract excep-
tion, simply recognizes that statements or conduct by the employer that
imply some form of job security for otherwise at-will employees may
rise to the level of contractually binding obligations.5 8 In the past, tradi-
tional principles of formalistic contract law, such as the requirements of
mutuality of obligation and express manifestations of assent, barred
this avenue for rebutting the at-will presumption.5 9 Contemporary con-
tract law, however, requires mutuality of obligation only if it constitutes
the sole consideration supporting a promise;60 if other consideration ex-
ists, mutuality is not required."e Because a single consideration may
support many promises, either an employee's obligation to work or the
employee's performance of services over time may support an em-
ployer's obligation both to compensate the worker and to refrain from
arbitrary dismissal.6 2
In addition, contract law's former requirement of an express mani-
festation of assent has given way to the use of course of performance,
prior dealings, and trade practice in discerning the actual agreement of
contracting parties.8" Thus, under the implied contract exception, the
absence of an express agreement binding the employee or supported by
consideration aside from the employee's work will not undercut an at-
tempt to rebut the at-will presumption.64 Instead, courts will consider
factors such as oral assurances or general statements regarding person-
57. The phrase "paradigm shift" is used here in the sense of a wholesale change in the con-
ceptual model underlying a subject area. See T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS
(2d ed. 1970).
58. Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 675-82, 765 P.2d at 383-88, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 221-27; Toussaint v.
Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 614-17, 292 N.W.2d 880, 892-93 (1980); Pine River State
Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 626-29 (Minn. 1983); Thompson, 102 Wash. 2d at 227-28, 685
P.2d at 1087-88.
59. See Note, Protecting At Will Employees, supra note 6, at 1819-20.
60. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 79 (1981).
61. Id.
62. 1 A. CORBIN, CORIN ON CONTRACTS § 125, at 536 n.68 (1963); 1A A. CORBIN, supra, § 152,
at 13-17; see also Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 679-80, 765 P.2d at 386-87, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 224-25.
63. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 4, 19, 202 (1981); U.C.C. §§ 1-205, 2-208
(1990). Some authors have described these works as effectively reversing the common-law pre-
sumption that the parties' writing contains the definitive and exhaustive contract terms. See Goetz
& Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the Interactions Between Express and
Implied Contract Terms, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 261, 273-76 (1985) (cited in Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 679, 765
P.2d at 386, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 224).
64. See supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text.
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nel practices, the employee's length of service, and industry practices in
determining the parties' true agreement.6
Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield6 exemplifies the operation
of the implied contract exception. In Toussaint the court held that an
employer could not dismiss an employee hired for an indefinite term
absent just cause because the employer had told the employee that he
would not be discharged "as long as he did his job," a policy expressly
reiterated in an employee handbook." The court held that these policy
statements gave rise to contractual rights even though no evidence ex-
isted that the parties mutually agreed that the policy statements would
create contractual rights.' The court also rejected the supposed re-
quirement of mutuality of obligation, noting that when an employer
chooses to establish and promulgate personnel practices, the employer
receives consideration in the form of a "cooperative and loyal work
force."6
Serious limitations exist on the salutary effects of the implied con-
tract exception for at-will employees.70 The impact of the implied con-
tract exception on at-will agreements seems likely to attenuate over
time. As businesses become more aware of the kind of materials to
which courts will accord contractual significance, they will constrict the
dissemination of these materials and thereby reduce the opportunity for
employees to use the exception. At-will disclaimers also probably will
play a large role in limiting the effectiveness of the implied contract
exception. 7 1 Finally, at least one state has purported to reject the im-
plied contract exception outright by requiring an express agreement to
rebut the at-will presumption.7 2
65. See, e.g., Pugh v. Sees Candies, 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 327, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981)
(cited in Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 680, 765 P.2d at 387, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 225).
66. 408 Mich. at 613-19, 292 N.W.2d at 891-95.
67. Id. at 613, 292 N.W.2d at 891.
68. Id. at 614-15, 292 N.W.2d at 892.
69. Id. at 615, 292 N.W.2d at 892.
70. The implied contract exception also has been criticized as incorporating bias in favor of
upper-level employees. See Note, Public Policy Exception, supra note 6, at 1935.
71. An at-will disclaimer disavows the existence of any contractual relation between the em-
ployer and employee that is not at will. Although some commentators have suggested that such
disclaimers constitute unconscionable contracts of adhesion, courts evidently have rejected this
view. See Chagares, supra note 33, at 378-80.
72. Sabetay v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 69 N.Y.2d 329, 336, 506 N.E.2d 919, 922-23, 514 N.Y.S.2d
209, 213 (1987). New York arguably has an implied contract exception, but with an extraordinarily
high burden of proof. See Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 57 N.Y.2d 458, 443 N.E.2d 441, 457
N.Y.S.2d 193 (1982) (allowing a cause of action when an employee handbook contained an express
limitation on the employer's right to terminate that was incorporated into an employment applica-
tion and on which the employee relied in rejecting other offers).
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D. The Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
The potentially broadest exception to the at-wil doctrine also has
contractual underpinnings. Following the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts" and the Uniform Commercial Code,7" a small number of
courts have implied a covenant of good faith and fair dealing into em-
ployment contracts. 5 Courts disagree about the precise effect of this
covenant on at-will agreements." At least one court has construed the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing expansively to prohibit the dis-
charge of an employee without good cause in certain circumstances."
Most courts that have recognized the covenant in employment con-
tracts, however, have advanced a more restrictive view of its effect.78
One line of cases interprets the covenant as prohibiting only bad cause
discharges, such as dismissal to prevent the vesting of benefits in which
the employee holds an equitable stake."' For example, in Fortune v.
National Cash Register Co.80 the court allowed a cause of action under
the good faith covenant against an employer who had fired an at-will
salesman to avoid paying a large commission. Other courts simply inter-
pret the covenant to proscribe the same set of discharges as the public
policy exception.8 1
The majority of courts confronting the issue, however, have refused
on both policy and analytical grounds to imply any version of the cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing into employment contracts. The pol-
icies that courts have adduced in opposition to the covenant reflect the
concerns that dominate the at-will debate as a whole: that the covenant
is an overbroad remedy;8 2 that its implication into at-will agreements
would restrict unduly an employer's discretion in managing its work
73. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981).
74. U.C.C. § 1-203 (1990).
75. See cases cited infra notes 77-81.
76. See id.
77. See, e.g., Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc. 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980)
(holding that an employee could not be discharged without good cause in a case in which the
employee was fired after 18 years against the express policy of the employer and thereby was
deprived of benefits).
78. See infra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
79. See Mitford v. de Lasala, 666 P.2d 1000, 1007 (Alaska 1983); Wagenseller v. Scottsdale
Memorial Hosp., 147 Ariz. 370, 710 P.2d 1025 (1985); Cort v. Bristol-Myers Co., 385 Mass. 300, 431
N.E.2d 908 (1982); K Mart Corp. v. Ponsock, 103 Nev. 39, 732 P.2d 1364 (1987); Hall v. Farmers
Ins. Exch., 713 P.2d 1027 (Okla. 1985).
80. 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977).
81. See, e.g., Magnan v. Anaconda Indus., 193 Conn. 558, 479 A.2d 781 (1984) (stating that a
breach of covenant exists when a discharge violates an important public policy); Howard v. Dorr
Woolen Co., 120 N.H. 295, 414 A.2d 1273 (1980) (modifying Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H.
130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974)).
82. See, e.g., Morriss v. Coleman Co., 241 Kan. 501, 518, 738 P.2d 841, 851 (1987); Breen v.
Dakota Gear & Joint Co., 433 N.W.2d 221 (S.D. 1988).
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force;83 that it does not strike the appropriate balance of employer and
employee interests; 84 that it would subject all firings to judicial incur-
sions into amorphous discharge standards;8 5 and finally, that the cove-
nant would amount to the judicial imposition of a collective bargaining
agreement, a move best left to the legislature.8
Courts have contended that, as an analytical matter, implying the
covenant into at-will employment agreements would render those agree-
ments internally inconsistent.87 In commercial contexts the covenant
imposes a duty on the contracting parties to exercise all rights and per-
form all obligations in good faith.8 Because at-will agreements allow an
employer to discharge an employee for bad cause, the covenant would
impose a duty on the employer to use good faith in making bad cause
discharges, a proposition that is merely a semantic step away from a flat
contradiction. 9 Given the apparently exclusive dilemma of choosing be-
tween enforcing a covenant of good faith and fair dealing and protect-
ing the at-will employers' right to fire for bad cause, these courts simply
have opted for the latter alternative. Consequently, the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing remains a limited exception to the at-will
doctrine.9 0
E. Statutory Exceptions
Statutory exceptions to the employment at-will doctrine generally
fall into two basic categories.91 Exceptions of the first variety prohibit
83. See, e.g., Wagenseller, 147 Ariz. at 386, 710 P.2d at 1041; Parnar v. Americana Hotels,
Inc., 65 Haw. 370, 377, 652 P.2d 625, 629 (1982); Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wash. 2d
219, 226-27, 685 P.2d 1081, 1086-87 (1984); Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 113 Wis. 2d 561, 569,
335 N.W.2d 834, 838 (1983).
84. See, e.g., Hillesland v. Federal Land Bank Ass'n, 407 N.W.2d 206, 214 (N.D. 1987);
Thompson, 102 Wash. 2d. at 226-27, 685 P.2d at 1086.
85. See, e.g., Parnar, 65 Haw. 370, 377, 652 P.2d 625, 629; Hillesland, 407 N.W.2d at 214;
Brockmeyer, 113 Wis. 2d at 569, 335 N.W.2d at 838.
86. See Thompson, 102 Wash. 2d at 226-27, 685 P.2d at 1086-87.
87. See, e.g., Murphy v. American Home Prods., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 448 N.E.2d 86, 461 N.Y.S.2d
232 (1983); Hillesland, 407 N.W.2d at 214; Thompson, 102 Wash. 2d at 226-27, 685 P.2d at 1086-
87.
88. See Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith,
94 HAv. L. REV. 369 (1980) (interpreting the covenant of good faith and fair dealing).
89. See sources cited supra note 87.
90. Although most courts that recognize the covenant in employment contracts construe its
breach as a contract action, see, e.g., ARCO Alaska, Inc. v. Akers, 753 P.2d 1150, 1153-54 (Alaska
1988); Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 682-700, 765 P.2d 373, 389-401, 254 Cal.
Rptr. 211, 227-39 (1988), at least three courts have construed it as a tort. See Carter v. Catamore
Co., 571 F. Supp. 94, 97 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (applying Rhode Island law); Dare v. Montana Petroleum
Mktg., 212 Mont. 274, 687 P.2d 1015 (1984); K Mart Corp. v. Ponsock, 103 Nev. 39, 45-47, 732
P.2d 1364, 1368-69 (1987).
91. See Note, supra note 11, at 514 (recognizing and describing these categories more fully).
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discharges based on specific conduct, such as whistleblowing 9 2 or char-
acteristics of the employee, such as race, sex, or age.98 The second, more
controversial, kind of legislation effectively proscribes all discharges
without just cause.94
III. ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST A JUST CAUSE DISMISSAL STANDARD
While applauding judicial recognition of exceptions to the at-wil
doctrine, many commentators nonetheless have argued for more exten-
sive reform.95 Noting that the current exceptions to the doctrine pro-
vide employees with less than uniform protection against arbitrary
discharges by employers, these commentators generally have advocated
the adoption of just cause dismissal standards.96 This call for reform,
however, has met with spirited opposition from a small group of norma-
tive legal theorists.97 These theorists argue that economic efficiency fa-
vors employment at will over just cause dismissal standards and that
the ubiquity of at-will employment best supports this claim.' Although
an agreement providing for only just cause dismissals can overcome the
presumption of at-will employment,99 employees regularly do not bar-
gain for these agreements. Because properly functioning markets by
definition allocate resources to those who value them most, by hypothe-
sis, employers must value at-will powers more than employees value the
job security that just cause provisions would provide.100 Judicially or
legislatively mandated just cause dismissal standards, therefore, would
fail to allocate scarce resources to those who value them most and result
in economic inefficiency. 101
Any proponent of general just cause dismissal standards must deal
with this powerful argument. Logically, two ways to refute the argu-
ment exist. One can challenge the assumption of a properly functioning
labor market by diagnosing a systemic market failure that causes the
regular adoption of at-will agreements in spite of their economic ineffi-
ciency. Alternatively, one can argue that although economically ineffi-
92. At least 10 states have enacted "whistleblower" statutes. See id. at 514 n.18 (stating
that California, Connecticut, Iowa, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, Rhode
Island, and Utah have enacted whistleblower statutes).
93. See, e.g., Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988); Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988).
94. See statutes cited supra note 7. The Virgin Islands statute has hybrid characteristics in
that it spells out acceptable causes for dismissal.
95. See sources cited supra note 6.
96. See id.
97. See sources cited supra note 11.
98. See Epstein, supra note 11, at 965-66; Freed & Polsby, supra note 11, at 1097-99.
99. See Payne v. Western & Atl. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884).
100. Freed & Polsby, supra note 11, at 1097-99.
101. Id.
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cient, just cause standards are morally superior to the at-will doctrine.
A. Economic Arguments
1. The Monopoly Power Explanation
Commentators most often identify unequal bargaining power as the
market failure responsible for causing the prevalence of at-will employ-
ment.102 Employment at will creates economic inefficiencies, according
to this view, because the doctrine allows employers to use their radi-
cally unequal bargaining power to force employees into a position from
which employees may be discharged arbitrarily, even though rational
employees may value job security more than rational, profit-maximizing
employers value the right to fire arbitrarily. 0 3 Under this theory, even
if employees wanted to bargain for just cause dismissal standards, em-
ployers would refuse; 04 the loss of employees and their particular skills,
character, and willingness to work, along with the threat of losing em-
ployees to a competitor, are not sufficient to motivate an employer to
bargain over job security. 05
Of course, for many employees, this assertion simply ignores real-
ity; in many instances, for example, the employee's labor talents are
sufficiently unique or in demand to induce an employer to bargain over
job security and employment perquisites. As a result, the argument that
employers' unequal bargaining power leads to at-will agreements and
explains their ubiquity applies only to those employees for whom work-
ing on the employer's terms is a practical economic necessity. Only an
employee subject to this "monopoly power"'' 0 of an employer can be
forced to accept at-will employment. The possession of monopoly power
by employers, therefore, explains only those at-wil agreements entered
into by employees truly subject to the exercise of monopoly power.
The monopoly power explanation for the ubiquity of at-wil agree-
ments gains force from the fact that those employees subject to monop-
102. See Blades, supra note 6, at 1410-13; Freed & Polsby, supra note 11, at 1099-1102.
103. For a description and criticism of this theory, see Freed & Polsby, supra note 11, at
1099-1102.
104. See id.
105. See id.
106. This Note eschews the use of the term "monopsony" in favor of a more intuitive term. A
monopsony exists when workers can sell their labor to only one employer. "Monopsonistic condi-
tions may exist when there are few purchasers of labor, each of whom has power to control wage
levels." See Harrison, supra note 14, at 352 n.129 (citing A. REEs, THE ECONOMICS OF WORK AND
PAY 75-80 (1973)). As the phrase is used in this Note, an employer has "monopoly power" over an
employee only if it is a practical economic necessity that the employee work on that employer's
terms. Defining "monopoly power" in this way leaves logical room for the possibility that condi-
tions other than monopsony may render an employee subject to coercion by an employer over
employment terms.
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oly power are likely to suffer the most from being at-will employees.
The expected harm 7 from a firing in bad faith or without cause is
greatest in these cases because, by definition, these employees are least
likely to be able to find a comparable job and lack the resources to cope
with unemployment. Thus, the class of employees with the most incen-
tive to object to at-will employment has the least amount of bargaining
power to do so.
Commentators have tendered various objections to the monopoly
power explanation for the prevalence of at-will agreements.108 First, the
monopoly power explanation does not account for the number of at-will
employees not subject to monopoly power.109 The best response to this
objection is that these employees simply do not need to bargain for
more job security because they possess characteristics, such as unique
or otherwise marketable skills, that give them leverage in bargaining
with employers. These same characteristics lower both the probability
of discharge and the amount of potential harm these employees would
suffer from an arbitrary discharge. As a result, employees who are not
subject to monopoly power have significantly less incentive to bargain
for job security than other employees.
A second, more powerful objection to the monopoly power explana-
tion holds that the theory does not predict the existence of at-will
agreements even for those employees' truly subject to monopoly
power.110 As commentators have noted, if the law forced monopolistic
employers to provide employees with just cause job security, employers
merely would use their monopoly power to shift the resulting costs back
to employees in the form of lower wages."' Because the employer's la-
bor costs would remain the same either way, the employer would have
no reason to prefer at-will employment over paying lower wages in com-
bination with a just cause dismissal standard.11 2 An employer's posses-
sion of monopoly power, therefore, fails to explain why that employer
would choose employment at will over other, equally profitable methods
of conducting business.113
Intuitively, employment at will necessarily would seem to cost the
employer less than a just cause dismissal standard combined with lower
wages. Perhaps even a monopolistic employer cannot shift all the costs
107. An event's expected harm equals the probability that it will occur multiplied by the
amount of monetary damage the event would cause if it occurred. See 1R POsNER, TORT
LAw-CAsEs AND EcONOmlc ANALysis 1 (1982) (defining the "expected cost" of an event).
108. See infra notes 109-31 and accompanying text.
109. See Note, Protecting At Will Employees, supra note 6, at 1829.
110. Freed & Polsby, supra note 11, at 1101-02.
111. See id. at 1102; Harrison, supra note 14, at 344-45.
112. Freed & Polsby, supra note 11, at 1101-02; Harrison, supra note 14, at 354.
113. Freed & Polsby, supra note 11, at 1101-02.
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of job security to the employee. If the reason that a monopolistic em-
ployer cannot shift all of these costs to the employee is that employees
would quit, however, then this fact conflicts with the assumption of a
monopolistic employer. Working on the employer's terms is not a prac-
tical economic necessity for an employee who realistically has the op-
tion of quitting under these circumstances. Thus, the claim that
employers cannot shift all the costs of job security to the employee can-
not resuscitate the monopoly power explanation, for that claim conflicts
with the assumption that the employee is subject to the employer's mo-
nopoly power.
The possession of monopoly power by employers, therefore, does
not explain completely the ubiquity and persistence of employment at
will; some additional fact must explain why employers use their monop-
oly power to establish employment at will rather than other, equally
profitable, employment relationships. The explanation cannot be that
employers prefer employment at will solely because it saves administra-
tive and other costs associated with stricter dismissal standards; for
under the assumption of a monopolistic employer, the employer always
could shift these costs to employees in the form of lower wages. Em-
ployers could force even employees protected by minimum wage legisla-
tion to bear the costs of job security through less frequent wage raises
and the reduction or elimination of fringe benefits.
Although it can be argued that monopolistic employers prefer em-
ployment at will because it provides unparalleled incentives for superior
employee performance, various objections undercut this argument. In
theory, employees will improve or maintain their output to lessen the
possibility of arbitrary discharge. If an employer is determined to fire
an employee arbitrarily, however, considerations of employee perform-
ance are unlikely to enter into the employer's decision. To the extent
that employees recognize that their on-the-job performance has no
bearing on the probability of arbitrary discharge, this realization will
reduce their performance incentives. In addition, as both courts114 and
commentators 15 have argued, job security actually may increase worker
productivity and efficiency by improving job satisfaction.
The only remaining possibility is a disconcerting one: monopolistic
employers prefer employment at will on the irrational ground that it
114. See, e.g., Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 519, 613, 292 N.W.2d 880,
892 (1980) (concluding that job security benefits the employer through producing a loyal and coop-
erative work force).
115. See, e.g., Decker, At-Will Employment: Abolition and Federal Statutory Regulation, 61
U. Dr. J. URB. L. 351, 364 (1984). But see Freed & Polsby, supra note 11, at 1131-34 (concluding
that job security affects employee performance and efficiency only tangentially and possibly even
negatively).
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enables them to fire employees arbitrarily. This preference for employ-
ment at will is irrational because, by definition, an arbitrary discharge
is not related to business considerations, such as economic necessity or
the employee's on-the-job performance. Thus, monopolistic employers
seemingly have no reason to want the power to fire arbitrarily, but nev-
ertheless use their monopoly power to achieve precisely that end.11
The power to fire arbitrarily does represent an attractive freedom
from regulation, which may explain this irrational desire, at least in
part. Regardless of whether stricter dismissal standards actually would
have any negative impact on the employer's business, they may seem to
encroach on employer discretion in controlling the workplace, thereby
relinquishing powers to the judiciary that naturally seem to belong to
the employer. Rational or not, employment at will may seem to be the
last refuge for employers besieged with attempts to lessen their plenary
power over the workplace.117
2. The Employee Misperception Explanation
Commentators have offered employee misperception as the other
principal market defect that explains the prevalence of employment at
will. 18 According to this view, employees fail to bargain for just cause
dismissal standards because they erroneously perceive the risk of arbi-
trary dismissal to be low.1 9 These misperceptions by employees may
result from the common psychological tendency to discount unpleasant
possibilities, such as job loss, or from an inability to obtain accurate
information on the employer's dismissal practices.12 0 In addition, em-
ployers may convey a less-than-accurate image of job security and
thereby exacerbate employees' misperceptions. 21
Whatever the cause of the misperceptions, this explanation implies
that employers might yield to just cause dismissal standards in ex-
change for lower wages, but employees simply never bargain for it dur-
ing hiring negotiations. The result is an efficiency loss. Because markets
116. See Note, supra note 11, at 517 (noting that an employer would seem to have no reason
to violate a just cause dismissal statute). Although the author develops an economic rationale for
the right to fire arbitrarily, the author assumes a competitive labor market, and, therefore, this
rationale does not apply when employers exert monopoly power. Id. at 511-12 & n.7.
117. See, e.g., International Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., No. 89-1215 (U.S. Mar. 20,
1991) (holding that Title VII bans sex-specific fetal protection policies).
118. See Freed & Polsby, supra note 11, at 1103-30; Note, supra note 11, at 524; Note, Pro-
tecting At Will Employees, supra note 6, at 1830-32.
119. See Note, supra note 11, at 524; Note, Protecting At Will Employees, supra note 6, at
1831. These authors simply assume that the risk of arbitrary discharge is high enough that a rea-
sonable person could not disregard it. But see Freed & Posby, supra note 11, at 1105-07 (arguing
that the risk of arbitrary discharge is low enough for a reasonable person to disregard).
120. See Note, Protecting At Will Employees, supra note 6, at 1831.
121. Id.
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operate efficiently and allocate scarce resources to those who value
them most only if all market participants can make fully informed re-
source valuations, employee misperception of the risks of arbitrary dis-
charge and the commensurate value of job security will result in
economic inefficiency. 1
22
The employee misperception explanation for the prevalence of em-
ployment at will seems to hinge precariously on the assumption that
the risk of arbitrary discharge significantly exceeds employees' percep-
tions.123 Some commentators have rejected this assumption, arguing
both that employees tend to exaggerate, rather than discount, the
probability of arbitrary discharge and that the risk of arbitrary dis-
charge in any case remains so low that a reasonable person could disre-
gard it. 2 4
Two variations of the employee misperception explanation avoid
these criticisms. First, although the probability of an arbitrary dis-
charge may be low, discharge may place exorbitant costs on employees
subject to monopoly power. By definition, these employees cannot se-
cure comparable employment, 23 and as a result, their financial status is
likely to devolve quickly and permanently after an arbitrary discharge.
Thus, for these employees the expected harm'2 6 from an arbitrary dis-
charge is likely to be extremely high, or at least high enough that an
employee could not disregard it reasonably.
Under the second variation of the misperception explanation,
which actually constitutes an independent argument, employees may
perceive the risks and costs of an arbitrary discharge quite clearly, yet
still reasonably refrain from bargaining for job security.'27 Employees
reasonably could determine that inquiring about dismissal standards
would reflect badly on them, a circumstance that an at-will employee
subject to monopoly power quite literally cannot afford.1'2 8 Employment
at will embodies economic inefficiencies, according to this argument, be-
cause it unnecessarily raises the employees' costs of bargaining for job
security. 129
122. Id. at 1830.
123. See Freed & Polsby, supra note 11, at 1105-07 (calculating the probability that an em-
ployee will be discharged arbitrarily to be as low as .0154%).
124. See id. at 1107.
125. See supra note 106 (defining monopoly power).
126. See supra note 107 (defining expected harm).
127. See Note, supra note 11, at 524.
128. Id.
129. See id.
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B. Moral Arguments
The argument that the persistence of the at-will doctrine supports
its economic efficiency purports to make no comment on the morality of
the at-will doctrine.3 0 As those theorists supporting the doctrine's eco-
nomic efficiency have been quick to point out, economic efficiency is a
narrow concern that ethical constraints may supersede 31 Under this
view, economic efficiency and morality are discrete inquiries. 32 Thus,
even if employment at will is economically efficient, it may constitute a
morally despicable policy.
Of course, moral and economic considerations may not be as sepa-
rable as this analysis suggests. The definition of economic efficiency has
normative characteristics that commentators frequently ignore.133 For
example, the definition presumes market participants make only ra-
tional valuations of resources, but this assumption itself may carry
widely varying ethical implications.3 4 Conversely, in a world of scarce
resources, notions such as fairness may not have much content apart
from a particular conception of rational valuations or distributions of
resources. Thus, economic concepts and arguments may start to look
like moral ones and vice versa.
Strong intuitions support the argument, however, that the employ-
ment at-will doctrine is inherently unfair. 35 The at-will doctrine effec-
tively removes the task of predicting the costs of employee job security
from employers and instead burdens employees with predicting the
probability and costs of arbitrary discharge. Of course, employers seem
to have an incentive to avoid predicting the costs of job security be-
cause the expense necessarily includes the additional litigation costs im-
posed by stricter dismissal standards, costs that are difficult to predict
and pose a high risk of miscalculation. But employees typically have
less access to resources that would enable them to predict accurately
the probability and costs of arbitrary discharge than employers have to
resources to predict accurately the costs of job security. Moreover, un-
130. Freed & Polsby, supra note 11, at 1144; Harrison, supra note 14, at 361; Note, supra
note 11, at 511-12.
131. See Freed & Poisby, supra note 11, at 1144; Harrison, supra note 14, at 361; Note,
supra note 11, at 524.
132. See sources cited supra note 131.
133. E.g., Harrison, supra note 14, at 355 (noting that "[a]n efficient allocation is not neces-
sarily one that favors those who desire or need the right most, or even those who[m] it would make
happiest") (footnote omitted).
134. In fact, two diametrically opposed moral philosophies, utilitarianism and Neo-Kantian-
ism, claim rationality as their basis. Compare R. HARE, MORAL THINKING (1981) (advocating utili-
tarianism) with J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971) (advocating Neo-Kantian theory of justice).
135. But see Epstein, supra note 11, at 953-55 (criticizing fairness critiques of employment
at will by emphasizing the importance of freedom of contract).
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like employees, employers can shift at least some of any unexpected
costs of job security to consumers and employees and spread these costs
over time, even in nonmonopolistic contexts. In short, employers seem
much more capable of providing job security to employees than employ-
ees do of shouldering the burdens of the at-will doctrine. The at-will
doctrine thus runs counter to the intuitive notion of fairness that those
who can best bear a particular burden should do so.
The imposition of an across-the-board just cause standard for all
employees, however, also could cause substantial unfairness. By defini-
tion, employees who are not subject to monopoly power have skills or
other characteristics that enable them to switch employers more easily
than other employees."3 6 As a result, employees not subject to monopoly
power are much more likely to respond to a wage reduction exacted as a
quid pro quo for just cause job security by quitting. This fact may cause
employers to shift to employees subject to monopoly power some of the
costs of providing job security to employees not subject to monopoly
power. Thus, employees subject to monopoly power would bear not only
the costs of their own job security, but at least part of the costs of job
security for employees not subject to monopoly power. 37 The resulting
unfairness is exacerbated by the fact that employees subject to monop-
oly power form the class least capable of bearing these additional costs.
A uniform just cause standard, therefore, could engender the same kind
of unfairness as employment at will.
IV. A PROPOSAL: A REBUTTABLE JUST CAUSE PRESUMPTION
Notice, however, that the moral and economic arguments against
employment at will have their greatest, if not their only, force in mo-
nopolistic contexts. Employees not subject to monopoly power simply
do not have the same need for job security as employees subject to mo-
nopoly power. The probability and costs of an arbitrary discharge
would be significantly lower for these employees than for employees
who are subject to monopoly power. Employees not subject to monop-
oly power, therefore, rationally may value higher wages in combination
with no job security more than lower wages and a just cause dismissal
standard. As a result, applying a mandatory just cause standard to
these employees likely would fail to allocate resources according to the
values set by rational market participants and thereby would result in
economic inefficiency.
136. See supra note 106 and accompanying text (discussing employees who are subject to
monopoly power).
137. See Harrison, supra note 14, at 345 (concluding that in monopolistic contexts the costs
of job security absorbed by workers will be related inversely to their skill, education, and wealth).
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Moreover, employees not subject to monopoly power are more
likely to possess the resources to investigate and compare employers'
personnel policies. Also, because arbitrary discharge poses less of a
threat for these employees, they may be more apt to inquire and negoti-
ate with prospective employers over dismissal standards. Thus, employ-
ees not subject to monopoly power tend to know more about the risks
of arbitrary discharge and to make informed decisions about whether to
bargain for more job security than employment at will provides. The
employee misperception argument, therefore, applies with less force to
these employees, and the persistence of employment at will in this class
of employees is strong evidence of the doctrine's economic efficiency.
Consequently, a mandatory just cause standard applied to employees
not subject to monopoly power likely would create economic
inefficiencies. 138
Reversing the presumption of employment at will would avoid
these problems by differentiating between distinct labor markets. In-
stead of presuming that employees hired for an indefinite term are dis-
chargeable at will, courts should establish a rebuttable presumption
that these employees can be fired only for just cause. Employers could
rebut the presumption by proving two elements: the employer's lack of
monopoly power over the employee and some form of an at-will agree-
ment. Thus, employees not subject to monopoly power could sign at-
will disclaimers and thereby continue forging employment at-will rela-
tionships almost as easily as under the at-will doctrine.
For employees subject to monopoly power, 39 on the other hand, at-
will disclaimers, or other means of rebutting the just cause presump-
tion, would be virtually per se invalid. Employers still could establish
employment at-will relationships with these employees, but only by us-
ing procedural safeguards that would ensure a coercion-free bargaining
process. Employers would be required to give the employee an unfet-
tered choice between at-will and just cause dismissal standards. Of
course, an employer could provide incentives, such as higher wages, for
employees to choose the at-will option. The burden of proof, however,
would be on the employer to show that its hiring practices would in-
form a reasonable person fully about the consequences of at-will em-
ployment and that it made good faith efforts to encourage an
independent choice by the employee.
The test for determining the existence of monopoly power would
follow this Note's definition of that phrase: An employer has monopoly
138. Id. at 358 (stating that "[w]hat is efficient in one labor market may be inefficient in
another").
139. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
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power over an employee if and only if it is a practical economic neces-
sity that the employee work on that employer's terms.140 In short, if
economic circumstances allow the employee the realistic option of quit-
ting when the employer refuses to bargain over job security, then that
employee is not subject to monopoly power.
Thus construed, a rebuttable just cause presumption would in-
crease economic efficiency by allowing distinct dismissal standards to
govern discrete labor markets, while providing just cause job security to
those employees who need it most. A rebuttable just cause presumption
would protect those employees who, if discharged arbitrarily, would
cost society the most, while allowing employees not subject to monopoly
power greater freedom in determining the amount of job security that is
appropriate for them. If these latter employees mistakenly choose at-
will employment because of misperceptions or lack of information, their
expected harm in the event of arbitrary discharge is likely to be low
enough to be outweighed by the costs that the at-will doctrine saves
employers.
Moreover, a rebuttable just cause presumption would provide em-
ployers with an incentive to disclose to employees the amount of job
security they actually possess. Under the at-will doctrine, employers
have the incentive to remain quiet during job negotiations in the hope
of achieving the at-will employment relationship they irrationally pre-
fer.14 1 A rebuttable just cause presumption, on the other hand, would
motivate employers to discuss the issue of dismissal standards even in
negotiations with employees not subject to monopoly power, for if em-
ployers do not broach the issue, they cannot rebut the just cause pre-
sumption. Because the employer, rather than the employee, must open
the subject, employee inhibitions about discussing job security also will
be countered. Since a rebuttable just cause presumption would promote
more informed bargaining, it would increase economic efficiency.
Additionally, reversing the presumption of employment at will
would avoid the fairness criticisms"' that plague both employment at
will and across-the-board just cause standards. Under a rebuttable just
cause presumption, employees subject to monopoly power would no
longer bear the burden of predicting or absorbing the costs of an arbi-
trary discharge. Also, some, if not most, employees not subject to mo-
nopoly power would be at-will employees under a rebuttable just cause
presumption, whereas none of these employees would be at-will employ-
ees under a general just cause standard. Employees subject to monopoly
140. See supra note 106 (defining monopoly power).
141. See supra notes 119-23 and accompanying text.
142. See supra notes 131-38 and accompanying text.
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power, therefore, would pay primarily for their own job security
through lower wages and not for job security for these other employees.
In this way, reversing the presumption of employment at will would
ameliorate the unfairness of an across-the-board just cause standard.
Possible employer concern with the supposed unpredictability that
would stem from a rebuttable just cause presumption is largely un-
founded. Under employment at will, employers readily distinguish be-
tween those employees they can force into employment at will and
those they cannot. It would be disingenuous for employers to suggest
that under a rebuttable just cause presumption they suddenly are una-
ble to make this distinction.
Finally, as some commentators have implied, the class of employees
subject to monopoly power as defined in this Note may be extremely
small or nonexistent. 14 Arguably, all employees possess some market
power in the form of the ability to quit and work elsewhere. Even if this
class of employees is nonexistent, however, this Note's rebuttable just
cause presumption would increase overall economic efficiency by pro-
moting informed bargaining over job security.
V. CONCLUSION
Although various judicial and statutory exceptions to employment
at will provide employees with some measure of protection from arbi-
trary discharge, these exceptions are limited and sometimes unavaila-
ble. The prevalence of at-will agreements seems attributable to various
systemic market defects, such as employers' possession of monopoly
power, employer irrationality, and employee misperceptions, which
cause the regular adoption of at-will agreements in spite of their eco-
nomic inefficiency. Moreover, the doctrine of employment at will con-
flicts with basic notions of fairness. Thus, the case against employment
at will and in favor of just cause dismissal standards seems persuasive.
An across-the-board just cause standard, however, also would be eco-
nomically inefficient because employees not subject to monopoly power
rationally may choose at-will employment over a just cause standard.
An across-the-board just cause standard could engender substantial un-
fairness by forcing employees subject to monopoly power to bear a dis-
proportionate share of the costs of job security.
Reversing the presumption of employment at will and instituting a
rebuttable just cause presumption would remedy the economic and
moral defects that inhere in both employment at will and across-the-
143. See Epstein, supra note 11, at 973 (doubting the existence of employers' "inexhaust-
ible" bargaining power); Freed & Polsby, supra note 11, at 1100-01 (arguing that monopoly power
could not exist in a capitalist economy).
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board just cause standards. A rebuttable just cause presumption would
allow different labor markets to be governed by distinct dismissal stan-
dards, thereby preserving and improving upon the economic benefits of
employment at will, while providing job security to those who need it
most.
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